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ABSTRACT
This Article—the second half of a diptych that begins with Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality
Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455 (2020)—seeks to fill in the academic void in feminist and constitutional
scholarship by developing the constitutional argument for marital freedom as a gender equality right. The previous
Article showed that a constitutional regime committed to substantive gender equality must provide a readily
available exit from marriage to disestablish sexist relations and alleviate gender stratification. This Article
continues this project by constructing a constitutional argument for marital freedom under formal equality theory.
It shows that divorce-restrictive regulations were historically animated by discriminatory purposes and that fault
grounds continue to be applied in ways that raise equal protection concerns. It further shows that the contemporary
movement to restrict divorce repeats history: its impetus is to shore up the hierarchical family structure based on
constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women to the constraining sex-roles of the separate-spheres
tradition. The Article concludes that the dictates of constitutional gender equality, however narrowly defined,
require the state to provide a liberal no-fault right of exit from the status-harm of subordinating marriages. Marital
freedom is thus not simply a legal remedy for broken hearts, but the linchpin of a social order committed to securing
genuine gender equality and human dignity for all women.
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INTRODUCTION
The previous Article in this diptych, Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality
Right,1 argued that substantive mandates of equal protection—largely
understood through the prism of an anti-subordination theory—require
constitutional recognition of a right to marital freedom. This Article
develops the same constitutional argument from an antidiscrimination
vantage point, employing the formal doctrinal framework through which the
Supreme Court analyzes questions of gender equality.
Strict divorce laws, the previous Article observed, do not overtly
discriminate between the sexes, but they disproportionately harm women
nevertheless.2 The previous Article further maintained that divorce
restrictions that lock women into marriages in which abuse may reign and
sex roles are rigidly assigned channel women into circumscribed lives and
impede their progress toward full citizenship status. In this way, divorce
restrictions are covert gender-based legislation, perpetuating gender
stratification in effect, even though they are sex-neutral in form.
In part, the disparate impact of such legislation is felt because men’s and
women’s experiences with marriage are so different—divorce restrictions
preserve relationships that are sites for subordination for many women and
that exacerbate gender inequalities even outside of marriage.3 As a result,
women have largely been the prime suitors of marital freedom; the
feminization of divorce thus elicits the gendered operation of neutral
impediments to exit.4 Divorce restrictions also have a disparate impact
because the costs of delay are much higher for women than for men.

1
2
3

4

22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455 (2020).
See generally Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
455 (2020).
Id. Perhaps the most thoughtful exposition of this argument was made by the early feminist
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as powerfully maintained in Professor Tracy A. Thomas’s award-winning
book, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & THE FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS OF FAMILY LAW (N.Y.U.
Press 2016). As the book shows, the call for a reform of the private sphere of the family as key to
women’s equality had nineteenth-century roots. For Stanton, divorce was not simply a gender
equality right; it was, in some cases, a gender duty that enabled women to enforce their own vision
of marriage and transform this relationship into a more egalitarian union. See THOMAS, supra, at
ch. 3.
On the concept of the “feminization of divorce,” see Karin Carmit Yefet, Unchaining the Agunot:
Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women’s Marital Freedom, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 441,
451 (2009).
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Women’s reproductive capacity and—arguably their marriageability—
declines far more rapidly than men’s as they age. Consequently, divorce
regimes that make women wait impair their post-divorce prospects of
remarrying and having children.5 Moreover, the feminization of poverty
renders burdensome—and therefore prohibitively expensive—divorce
procedures particularly detrimental for women6 and may force some to forgo
divorce altogether.7 The onerous burdens of divorce restrictions on women
are so pronounced that some commentators have envisaged a divorce model
that reserves a unilateral right of exit to women only.8

5

6

7

8

Voluminous research establishes that women’s supposed value in the marriage market
“depreciates” relative to men’s as they get older, due to different mortality rates, the presence of
children, and many men's lingering preference for younger women. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage,
Divorce and Quasi Rents: Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 278–87
(1987) (discussing the reasons why woman’s perceived marriageability declines with age); Katharine
T. Bartlett, Saving the Family From the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 840 (1998) (same); Amy
L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV.
509, 547–50 (1998) (discussing the different currency of men and women in the marriage market).
See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, The Cost of Fault-Based Divorce, 82 SUPRA 131 (2013); Molly Dragiewicz &
Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical Data for Lawyers Considering Equal
Protection Analysis, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 229, 244 (2009) (referencing studies
discussing women’s lower socioeconomic status and linking it to gender subordination in the private
and public spheres); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS:
CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE
HOUSING MARKET 39, 44 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988) (noting the substantial costs of faultbased divorce litigation). No-fault divorce, in marked contrast, leads to a significantly less costly
divorce, as it rarely involves court, attorneys, or other costs. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE
AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 148 (1991); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 165 (1991).
Indeed, research has found that the entire divorce process is shaped by the inability of many women
to afford proper representation and handle fault proceedings. See Schafran, supra note 6; Jane
Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt? Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 624 (1999); Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at
Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (2000); Penelope E. Bryan, Woman’s Freedom to Contract
at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1174–80 (1999); Karen Czapanskiy,
Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27
FAM. L.Q. 247, 250–51 n.11 (1993); Cynthia M. VanSickle, A Return to the Anti-Feminist Past of Divorce
Law: The Implications of the Covenant or Marriage Laws as Applied to Women, 6 J.L. SOC’Y 154, 167–68
(2005). Judges exacerbate this problem by their frequent refusal to award attorney fees during
and/or after the divorce proceeding. Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission,
42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (1990); Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L.
REV. 485, 528, 550–51 (1993).
See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage “for the Sake of the Children”: A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth
Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435, 1450 n.77 (1992).

May 2020]

DIVORCE AS A FORMAL GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT

797

To these substantial gender disparities in neutral impediments to exit,
however, the Supreme Court’s formal equality jurisprudence is largely
indifferent. The Court’s gender-discrimination doctrine treats marriage as
an institution devoid of special equal-protection concerns for women and
thus ignores the gendered harm wrought by family regulations so long as they
are facially neutral and have no discriminatory purpose. In so doing, the
formal understanding of equality effectively effaces the gender-specific effects
of divorce policies that enforce status relations between men and women.
Limits on divorce thus expose the limits of sex-neutrality and formal equality
principles as a vehicle for the advancement of substantive gender equality.
This Article contends that a unilateral right to no-fault divorce is
constitutionally mandated—even under the Court’s narrow antidiscrimination-oriented jurisprudence. The constitutional argument for
marital freedom as a formal gender-equality right is developed in three Parts.
Part I delineates and dissects the formal paradigm of equal-protection
doctrine. In essence, the Supreme Court pivots its equality jurisprudence on
the antidiscrimination principle, which only prohibits state action that
overtly classifies citizens on the basis of group membership or that is
ostensibly neutral but in fact motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
Part II exposes the lineage and function of divorce restrictions as genderstatus regulations and shows that limitations on divorce have been associated
historically with either the patriarchal desire to control women or the
paternalistic effort to protect them. The fault system in particular—
traditionally based on the unholy trinity of adultery, cruelty, and desertion as
all-American grounds for dissolution9—reflected the ideology of the
separate-spheres tradition, which the government is prohibited from
enforcing by the antidiscrimination interpretation of equality. Even today,
as shown in Part II, the judicial implementation of fault divorce is susceptible
to gender-based stereotyping that inculcates the repressive elements of the
traditional family structure.
Finally, Part III argues that contemporary attempts to restrict divorce
and reinstate fault thresholds repeat history and are animated, at least in part,
by a discriminatory purpose: to shore up the hierarchical marital family

9

J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 13 (1997). For an overview of traditional fault grounds and what they entail, see
HOMER H. CLARK JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS
656–59 (7th ed. 2005).
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predicated on constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women to
the roles of wives and mothers. The conservative family values coalition, in
particular, seeks to legally resuscitate the ideological origins of the fault
system, based on impermissible status-based judgments about women’s
capacities, roles, and destinies.
The Article concludes that existing, purportedly neutral barriers to exit
are unconstitutional violations of formal gender equality since they have both
the purpose and effect of turning back the clock—not only on divorce rights,
but also on women’s status in the family and society.
I. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE: A FORMAL
GENDER-EQUALITY PARADIGM
Grounded in experience with slavery and racial segregation, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been
understood to guard against the false theory of racial difference and black
inferiority.10 Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has long
stressed the principle of color-blindness or “anti-discrimination” as the
mediating principle at the core of equal protection.11 By virtue of this
principle, also called the “anti-classification” or “anti-differentiation”
principle, state classifications on “suspect” bases are invalid unless they satisfy
the constitutional touchstones of strict scrutiny.12 Where a law creates no
10

11

12

See, e.g., Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV.
111, 111–12 (1991) (“[T]he central meaning of the equal protection clause, and indeed of the
Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, is that the law must be colorblind.”).
See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) (“The
antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because . . . race-dependent decisions that are
rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on
assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the related phenomenon of racially
selective sympathy and indifference.”); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1004–06 (1986) (explaining that the “anti-differentiation”
principle underlies heightened scrutiny models and demands “equal treatment”); Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (emphasizing that the
“antidiscrimination principle” is a “mediating principle” that bridges the facial ambiguity of the
text of the Equal Protection Clause and the judicially crafted meaning contained therein).
Classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage have all been considered “suspect”
classes deserving of strict scrutiny, the strictest level of judicial review. See Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (noting that prior cases that involved state discrimination against “aliens
as a class” prompted “close scrutiny” but declining to adopt a bright-line rule); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting “traditional indicia of suspectness” that might
warrant heightened scrutiny as a class “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
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express classifications but still has a disparate impact on a suspect group, the
Supreme Court finds discrimination only if the state acted with
discriminatory intent in enacting the facially neutral law.13
Given the racial context of the Equal Protection Clause, how does it apply
to laws that forge sex-based classifications or that utilize sex-neutral terms but
exert a gendered impact? For the first hundred years of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s life, the Supreme Court routinely upheld legislation that
relegated women to secondary status, in opinions replete with separatespheres discourse affirming distinct roles for men and women in American
society.14 Only since the 1970s has the Court acknowledged that the Equal
Protection Clause is relevant to questions of gender justice.15 The Court
developed its gender-equality doctrine in an ahistorical manner by analogy
to its race-equality doctrine,16 establishing a “de facto ERA”17 that judges
sex-based classifications using a new level of intermediate scrutiny.18 To be

13

14

15
16

17

18

of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a history of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and
insular’ minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be
subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . .”) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944)); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (explaining that “only the most
exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination” based on “racial descent”).
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 246 (1976) (requiring challengers of facially
neutral state action to demonstrate that the challenged practice was animated by a discriminatory
purpose).
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding the automatic exclusion of women from
jury duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a prohibition on female bartenders);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitations on the hours worked by women).
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (invalidating, for the first time, a gender classification;
using the rational basis test to invalidate a preference for males over females as executors of wills).
Justice Brennan was the first to make this argument. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682–88 (1973) (concluding that sex-based discrimination is akin to race discrimination in that it is
based on historical stereotypes and “immutable characteristics” wholly unrelated to one’s ability to
“contribute to society”) (plurality opinion).
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 985 (2002)).
See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531–58 (1996) (applying a form of intermediate
scrutiny requiring “exceedingly persuasive justification” and ultimately holding as unconstitutional
the Virginia Military Institute’s all-male admissions policy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724–31, 733 (1982) (applying a form of intermediate scrutiny that examined motivating
biases and stereotypes; holding a state-sponsored all-female nursing school unconstitutional, in part
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upheld, sex-based classifications must be substantially related to an important
government objective.19
Further, any justification for sex-based classifications must not be based
on gender-role stereotypes.20 In a long line of equal-protection cases, the
Court invalidated gender classifications in family law because they reflected
sexual stereotypes of the separate-spheres tradition that presume, on the one
hand, breadwinning husbands, and on the other, domesticated wives focused
on home and married life.21 The Court indicated that the traditional and
even settled beliefs about women’s proper gender roles in the family and in
society, far from vindicating discrimination, are now a barometer
of constitutional invalidity.22 The Court has thus understood “antistereotyping” to be a central aspect of gender equal protection.23

19

20

21

22

23

because it was based on stereotypes about gender in nursing); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–
204, 210 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a statute prohibiting the sale of beer
to underage males only); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 653 (1975) (applying a
heightened standard of scrutiny to invalidate a provision of the Social Security Act giving survivor
benefits to females only).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). Some suggest that the VMI case
introduced “skeptical scrutiny” to sex-based discrimination, which “differs from strict scrutiny only
in name.” Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of Marriage Law,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233–35 (1998); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY
RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 62 (2005) (positing that “the Supreme Court
may be raising the level of scrutiny for gender much closer to that of race” after VMI).
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141–42, 146 (1994) (holding that gender-based
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where the discrimination
is informed by gender stereotypes).
See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725–26, 726 n.14 (noting the “broad range of statutes already invalidated by
[the] Court” that were based on “simplistic, outdated assumption[s]” about gender); see, e.g., Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause a state law provision based on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that accorded
ex-wives but not ex-husbands the right to receive alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a statute, based
on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that required widowers—but not widows—to prove
dependency on their deceased spouses in order to receive OASDI benefits).
See e.g., Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (“Where . . . the State’s . . . purposes are as well served by a genderneutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual
stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–
99 (holding impermissible the “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
in the home rather than in ‘the marketplace and world of ideas’”) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 15 (1975).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that state laws and practices reflecting stereotypical
assumptions about women’s proper roles are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. See David
H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination
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While the Court subjects overt sex-based classifications to heightened
scrutiny, in the context of sex it has also adopted a stringent discriminatory
intent requirement for laws that do not discriminate on their face. In Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court held that facially neutral state
action that has an adverse impact on women does not violate equal
protection unless it was selected or reaffirmed “at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”24 In
sum, the Court’s gender-equality jurisprudence, modeled after its raceequality paradigm, sounds in formalistic anti-discrimination norms by
focusing on the purpose and structure of challenged legislation, not on its
impact, to ensure that state actors are not motivated by stereotypical
judgments about women.25
Recognizing that the Supreme Court equates discrimination with
classification, regulatory bodies have wiped out traditional forms of genderstatus legislation and generally avoided justifying facially neutral regulations
using discredited status-based reasoning.26 As a result, laws today are almost
universally facially neutral and rationalized in non-discriminatory rhetoric,
yet many still perpetuate, even aggravate, racial and gender stratification.27
Thus, for example, absent evidence that state action was animated by a
discriminatory purpose, many of the most oppressive common-law maritalstatus doctrines—which were originally couched or recently have been
redefined in facially neutral terms—now survive equal-protection scrutiny.28

24
25

26

27

28

Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881, 1897 (1995) (noting the centrality of stereotyping analysis to
modern sex discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause).
Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (rejecting the proposition
that “class-based animus can be determined solely by effect.”); cf. Robin West, Equality Theory,
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 61 n.66 (1990) (noting
that a problem with anti-subordination approaches to Equal Protection Clause is that courts have
rejected them).
As Reva Siegel has explained, just as the conflicts culminating in the disestablishment of slavery
and later segregation produced a shift in the justificatory rhetoric of racial-status laws, the
discriminatory-purpose doctrine has caused a shift in the forms of state action that perpetuate the
gender stratification of American society. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119–29 (1997).
Id. at 1111, 1131 (demonstrating that the Court’s current interpretation of equal protection
“continues to authorize forms of state action that contribute to the racial and gender stratification
of American society.”).
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115
HARV. L. REV. 947, 1024–26 (2002).
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Progressive constitutional commentators have thus scathingly critiqued
the discriminatory purpose rule as outmoded in the wake of the
disestablishment of overt forms of race and gender classification.29 They
have further called for a new paradigm that would allow the Equal Protection
Clause to meaningfully target the contemporary forms of protected groups’
subordination.30 The Supreme Court, however, has regrettably failed to
modernize its equal-protection doctrine to rout out bias in ostensibly neutral
state action.31
Parts II and III will assume the challenge of establishing the
fundamental stature of marital freedom even under the formal dictates of
constitutional gender equality, however narrowly defined.
II. DIVORCE RESTRICTIONS AS GENDER-STATUS REGULATION
The Supreme Court recognizes that a policy’s historical background can
influence its contemporary interpretation and aid in the deduction of
present-day legislative intent.32 Analyzing divorce restrictions in historical
perspective, this Part argues, illuminates their function as gender-caste
legislation, a constitutionally significant feature otherwise obscured by their
gender-neutral terminology.
29

30
31

32

See, e.g., David Kairys, More or Less Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004); Carlos A.
Singer, The Stultification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 875, 882–83
(2004); Siegel, supra note 26, at 1135–46; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991).
See e.g., Siegel, supra note 26, at 1144.
Id. at 1141–42. For an egregious example, see Unites States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994)
(upholding sentencing guidelines that treated the possession of a given amount of crack cocaine
equally to 100 times that amount of powder cocaine, even though over ninety percent of defendants
possessing crack cocaine were blacks).
In order to demonstrate discriminatory purpose, an inquiry is made into whatever circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent is available, including the historical background of the decision, the
specific sequence of events leading up to the decision, departures from normal procedural sequence,
or the legislative or administrative history of the law. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality
Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995)
(discussing the importance of examining past regulatory practices as a way to detect otherwise tacit
forms of bias in the motivation, justification, and structure of present regulatory practices);
Catherine Wimberly, Deadbeat Dads, Welfare Moms, and Uncle Sam: How the Child Support Recovery Act
Punishes Single-Mother Families, 53 STAN. L. REV. 729, 750 (2000) (discriminatory purpose may be
“based on the statute’s legislative history as well as the general history of the problem the statute
was supposed to solve”).
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Using divorce restrictions to circumscribe women’s status in society is a
strategy that has been applied by Western legislatures over the course of
centuries. Female-initiated divorce was perceived in many countries as a
threat to the traditional social order, to husbandly authority and wifely
domesticity.33 Indeed, the fear that divorce would force marriage to
transmute into a more egalitarian relationship was key in restricting this
remedy throughout history.34 Western legislatures thus often adopted
stringent divorce policies with the express purpose of cementing hierarchical
relations as the organizing principle of marriage and ensuring that women
lived out their “destiny” as dutiful wives and mothers.35 In France, during

33

34

35

See, e.g., Joanna Alexandra Norland, When the Vow Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law Sounds
a Warning About the Implications for Women of the Contemporary American Marriage Movement, 17 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 330–31 (2002); see also, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND
THE FAMILY 18 (1989).
Norma Basch, Relief in the Premises: Divorce as a Woman’s Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815–1870, 8
L. & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1990); see also Norland, supra note 33, at 330. Indeed, divorce serves, as
bargaining theory predicts, as a “tool that women use to secure change and greater equality in
marital relationships.” Carrie Yodanis, Divorce Culture and Marital Gender Equality: A Cross-National
Study, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 644, 646 (2005). As Albert Hirschman argued in a different context,
an exit-threat point empowers a person to exercise a greater voice in influencing the course of events
so as to spare the need for exit. See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY
(1970).
Rules governing divorce in the Western World were often flagrantly discriminatory, allowing easy
path to marital freedom for men, but not for women. For example, in the Roman Empire, the law
of Romulus, promulgated in 450 B.C., permitted divorce to husbands but refused it to their wives.
Lawrence A. Moloney, Our Divorce Laws, 9 LOY. L. REV. 238, 240 (1923). Likewise, in Greece, the
husband enjoyed the sole prerogative to divorce his wife at will, for any or no reason. The wife,
however, was considered “incapable”; her only avenue to marital exit was to “submit a written
claim for divorce before the archon, who was the traditional protector of all incapables.”
See Kenneth Rigby, Report and Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the House Civil Law
and Procedure Committee of the Louisiana Legislature Relative to the Reinstatement of Fault as a Prerequisite to a
Divorce, 62 LA. L. REV. 561, 571 (2002). In Athens, a husband could shed his wife by merely sending
her away from his house; a woman, on the other hand, required the assistance of a male citizen to
bring a divorce suit. Id. at 572. In England as well, divorce law was characterized by a double
standard that made divorce more difficult to obtain for women. See Karin Carmit Yefet, Marrying
Dissolution to the Constitution: Divorce as a Fundamental Right, at ch. III, § II.A. (2012)
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with author).
While some legislatures preferred strict, unequal divorce laws so as to secure the contractual
gendered exchange of protection for obedience, for others “the relationship between husband and
wife involved no such reciprocal entitlements. It was simply required to replicate the dictatorial—
and insoluble—relationship of sovereign and minister.” See Norland, supra note 33, at 341. Yet,
even when divorce law equally applied to both men and women, partisans of “neutral” divorce
restrictions acknowledged that they would have an asymmetrical impact upon men and women
and thus would contribute to patriarchal authority and to the establishment of a doctrine of male
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the backlash to the French Revolution, for example, marital freedom
represented both political and gender anarchy and a no-divorce regime was
justified as a form of female control: “Just as political democracy, ‘allows the
people, the weak part of political society, to rise against the established
power,’ so divorce, ‘veritable domestic democracy,’ allows the wife, ‘the weak
part,’ to rebel against marital authority.”36 Allowing women equal access to
marital freedom also resulted in acrimonious debates over matters of gender
and divorce in mid-nineteenth-century England. In the legal imagination of
many of these debates’ participants, liberal divorce law mounted a sustained
challenge to marital hierarchy and undercut the foundations of masculine
privilege and patriarchal authority in marriage.37 The early history of
divorce debates in modern Italy also provides a powerful evincement of how
the doctrine of indissoluble marriage was perceived as a keystone of male
power and a major instrument for the cultivation of traditional gender roles
in Italian society.38 Modern historians have shown how public deliberations
and parliamentary records during Italy’s Liberal period conceptualized a nodivorce regime as protecting masculinity and its attendant privileges while
arguing that the introduction of divorce law was doomed to make “skirts into
trousers,” subvert the established gender order, and radically alter the
hierarchical architecture of the marital relationship.39
That legislatures intended, at least in part, to control women’s status
through limitations on exit is also apparent from feminist reactions to
stringent divorce laws throughout history.
Understanding marital
emancipation as a right articulating women’s social standing, an authority to
govern their own lives as independent decisionmakers, and as a means of
rebellion against intimate tyranny, feminists in many Western countries
protested strict divorce laws as violative of their rights as equal citizens. In
France, Ireland, and such Latin American countries as Argentina and Chile,

36
37
38

39

headship. See, e.g., id. at 336 (“the imperative of relegating wives to a subordinate position within
marriage necessitated additional restrictions on their right to petition for divorce.”); id. at 345–46.
LOUIS DE BONALD, DU DIVORCE CONSIDERE AU XIX SIÈCLE 182 (1818) (cited in JOAN
WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 47 (1988)).
LAWRENCE STONE, THE ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530–1987, at 375 (1990).
For analysis of the history of divorce debates in Italy as reflecting a determination to protect
traditional notions of masculinity and perpetuate the radical asymmetries of power underlying the
Italian marriage contract, see Mark Seymour, Keystone of the Patriarchal Family? Indissoluble Marriage,
Masculinity and Divorce in Liberal Italy, 10 J. MOD. ITALIAN STUD. 297 (2005).
Id. at 302.
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to take a few examples, feminists supported divorce law as “part of the
process of achieving female equality before the law and as a solution to the
age-old problems plaguing gender relations.”40 This long-held feminist
perspective is borne out by recent statistics: research examining the crossnational relationship between divorce culture on the national level and
gender equality in intact marriages in twenty-two legal systems found that
exit can exert a progressive transformative effect on patriarchal relationships.
Strikingly, countries in which divorce is an accepted sociolegal act were
clearly associated with greater marital equality, improved gender dynamics,
and a more egalitarian sex-role division in the family.41
Another recurring rationale for limiting marital exit was women’s
perceived moral weakness. Many legislatures sought rigid divorce laws
because they perceived women as moral inferiors who would abandon their
marriages if they only had the right to do so.42 Were women granted “the
seemingly merciful concession of permitting one spouse to petition for
divorce on the ground of adultery,” they posited, “women would stray
brazenly so as to reclaim their freedom.”43 At times, however, anti-divorce
crusaders carefully cloaked their attempts to control women in the
paternalistic discourse of protection, with some arguing that “women bring

40

41
42
43

ASUNCION LAVRIN, WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND
URUGUAY, 1890–1940, at 228–-29 (1995); see also Mala Htun, SEX AND THE STATE: ABORTION,
DIVORCE, AND THE FAMILY UNDER LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORSHIPS AND DEMOCRACIES 96,
104 (2003); Norland, supra note 33, at 327, 332, 338; Mags O’Brien, The History of Divorce in Ireland,
in DIVORCE? FACING THE ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN 9–12 (1995) (showing that women
figured prominently in divorce-action groups calling for the removal of the constitutional ban
throughout Ireland’s history). In the United States, however, there is a dissensus as to the role that
feminists played in promoting divorce reform. Compare Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s
No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 301–02 (1987); JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN,
MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 147 (2014)
(discerning that when gender equality figured on the reform agenda it “typically involved equality
for men”); Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities,
102 VA. L. REV. 79, 88 (2016) (arguing that men’s rights theorists called for a reform of fault
divorce, which “they perceived as unjustly benefitting women and depriving men of their natural
entitlements.”) with Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change,
1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 846 (1983); Laura Oren, No-Fault Divorce Reform in the 1950s: The Lost History
of the Greatest Project of the National Association of Women Lawyers, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 847 (2018)
(recovering the lost history of the National Association of Women Lawyers’ struggle to achieve
uniform no-fault divorce law reform in the 1950s).
Yodanis, supra note 34.
Norland, supra note 33, at 341.
Id.
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to marriage a ‘capital’ that is ‘consumed’ at its first use” such that
“indissoluble marriage represented an indemnity against the rapid
depreciation of women’s ‘value.’”44 Yet others have justified limitations on
divorce as a means to “protect” wives against the “indignities” of becoming
single,45 even as they were in fact “aiming to reinforce the dependence of
women on men within a hierarchical family structure.”46
In the United States, the first half of this diptych observed, liberal divorce
was considered anathema to the doctrine of marital unity and an affront to
husbandly authority.47 Indeed, liberalization of divorce was sometimes
openly opposed as jeopardizing male supremacy.48 Throughout American
history, until the 1970s, marital exit was almost exclusively limited to faultbased grounds, which envisioned divorce as a remedy for innocent spouses
where the guilty party was considered “maritally impaired” and occasionally
disqualified from remarrying.49 This regime “compensated” women for their
common-law disabilities by “safeguarding” their marriages so long as they
knew their place and properly performed their gendered marital roles.50 In
44
45
46

47
48

49

50

Seymour, supra note 38, at 310.
See, e.g., Norland, supra note 33, at 336 (explicating the sex-paternalist argument for divorce).
Id. at 322, 346 (recounting that while opponents of divorce “contended that they aimed to protect
women from abandonment, the focus of their concerns was the potential of the wife to disrupt the
social order by abandoning the nest.”).
See Yefet, supra note 2, at pt. II.A; see also THOMAS, supra note 3, at ch. 3.
See Yefet, supra note 2; see also Norland, supra note 33, at 324 (“Although the prohibition on divorce
applied to men as well as to women, the impact of this restriction was asymmetrical. It reinforced
husbands’ authority by denying women an opportunity to exit, or even to exert leverage by
threatening to do so.”).
See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tenn. 1955) (“Divorce in this state is not a matter
to be worked out for the mutual accommodation of the parties in whatever manner they may desire,
or in whatever manner the Court may deem to be fair and just under the circumstances. It is
conceived as a remedy for the innocent against the guilty.”); see also NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 49 (2000); ASHTON APPLEWHITE, CUTTING
LOOSE: WHY WOMEN WHO END THEIR MARRIAGES DO SO WELL 62 (1997); Lawrence M.
Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 653 (1984); Karl
N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288–89 (1933) (showing the
prohibition of remarriage to the “guilty” party was a common theme in nineteenth-century U.S.
legislation).
See, e.g., Gary L. Nichols, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L.
REV. 397, 426 (1998) (stating that until the no-fault divorce revolution, divorce law reinforced male
dominance in society); Norland, supra note 33 at 337; Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands:
Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 654 (2002) (arguing that
conformity with gendered norms benefited American women under the fault regime by legally
protecting them from divorce as long as they were good homemakers and caretakers); id. at 667
(stating that divorce was also viewed as a form of “punishment” for spouses who transgressed

May 2020]

DIVORCE AS A FORMAL GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT

807

other words, the marital cage, stripping women of legal and economic
independence, was celebrated as though it were a pedestal.51
In what follows, this Part shows how a limited right to fault divorce not
only burdened women’s exit but also concurrently enforced the gender status
norms of the separate-spheres tradition. Given the lineage of this divorce
regulation, this Part argues, it seems perverse that the mere use of genderneutral language could immunize current fault policies from exacting
constitutional review.
A. Sex Stereotypes in the Implementation of “Neutral” Divorce Legislation: A Look at
Past and Recent History
The fault-based divorce regime was designed to fulfill two primary
functions, both deeply at odds with the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. First, fault divorce was based on the overarching principle that
wives were subordinate to their husbands and on sex stereotypes envisioning
men as strong, disciplinarian, and independent, and women as passive,
nurturing, and subservient.52 Divorce law in this capacity functioned as
paternalistic legislation, with fault grounds that intended only to protect
women from “the most harmful implications of their inferior status without
attempting to change their status significantly.”53 Some fault-based grounds,

51

52

53

gendered marital roles); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1112
(1989); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 823–24 (1989).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (noting that, traditionally, sex discrimination
had been “rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage”).
The fault system was originally based on Christian doctrines that urged the “necessity of female
submission to male dominance.” VanSickle, supra note 7, at 163; see also, e.g., Ephesians 5:22–24;
Linda C. McClain, The “Male Problematic” and the Problems of Family Law: A Response to Don Browning’s
“Critical Familism”, 56 EMORY L.J. 1407, 1428 (2007); Rebecca L. Corrow, Shaping the American
Family by Inaction: The United States Constitution and “The Family,” 1788–1920, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 7, 8 (2004).
See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY
172, 179 (1988) (arguing that fault divorce envisioned that women needed not equality, only
paternalist protection from the worst physical and moral effects of their marital subordination);
VanSickle, supra note 7, at 158 (stating that the fault system is an “archaic divorce form founded
upon gender inequity—a form that subordinates women by casting them into the role of victim”);
id. at 178 (arguing that fault thresholds “serve an infantilizing function, portraying women as little
more than fragile and dependent children who need to be protected from the treachery and
duplicity of men”); Lawrence Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86
VA. L. REV. 1497, 1525 (2000) (“It was socially acceptable for a woman to be a victim; women
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for example, were framed in avowedly gendered terms, offering women
protection from the excesses of male authority. To illustrate, since “[m]an
is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender,” as the Court’s infamous
Bradwell decision paternalistically assumed,54 Alabama law accorded a wife
marital release when her husband defied this dictate and “his treatment to
her [wa]s cruel, barbarous and inhuman,” while Tennessee’s law referenced
a husband’s conduct “which would make her living with him unsafe and
improper.”55
Second, the fault regime was also based on sex-role stereotypes, normative
assumptions that conceived of husbands as market participants and of wives
as the mistresses of the home, a role that entailed economic dependency, selfsacrifice, and subservience.56 We have already observed, in the first half of
this diptych, how the laws of marriage constructed and maintained these
status relations by, for example, denying spouses the freedom to contractually
alter the gendered expectations of the traditional marital contract.57 Even
more effective, however, were the laws of divorce, which were structured to
reward those who conformed to normative gender roles and to penalize those

54
55

56

57

were, after all, the weaker sex. It was difficult for a man to claim he was deceived, deserted, or
beaten up by a woman.”).
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Jane Turner Censer, Smiling Through Her Tears: Ante-Bellum Southern Women and Divorce, 25 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 24, 27 (1981) (quoting statutes); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These
Boots are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 149
(2000) (finding that wives account for virtually all of the filing under the cruelty ground in the states
examined); MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570–1640,
at 180 (1987) (explaining that in England, where the fault system was inherited from, husbands
rarely sued their wives for cruelty because they feared being ridiculed by a society which believed
husbands should control their wives).
See generally Cahn, supra note 50 (discussing the historical importance of conformity with gender roles
in divorce proceedings); Nicole D. Lindsey, Note, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of “I Do,” an Analysis
of the Ever-Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 280 (1998) (describing how
the fault system emphasized traditional gender roles and threatened the economic independence of
women); VanSickle, supra note 7, at 171, 175 (noting that divorce judges have been influenced by
gendered assumptions of women as “inherently different from and inferior to men” and of “female
frailty and passivity”).
Yefet, supra note 2, at pt. III; see also, e.g., Watkins v. Watkins, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54, 56 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)) (“[A] married
woman cannot contract with her husband with respect to domestic services which are incidental to
[the] marital status . . . .”); Mays v. Wadel, 236 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind. App. 1968); Jill Elaine
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 866–70 (2004).
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who transgressed them.58 Indeed, since marriage laws were usually very brief
in detailing spousal rights and responsibilities,59 divorce law—through the
fault grounds it provided for dissolving a marriage—articulated the law’s
normative vision of marital life.60 By enforcing the marital exchange of
lifelong male support for lifelong female services, fault-based dissolution
artfully reproduced the distinctions between male and female spheres of
influence.61 Further, the double standard encapsulated in fault grounds—as
some scholars of divorce have rightly concluded—manifested a “judicial
blindness to the faults of men and indifference to the difficulties faced by
women.”62
Historically, this double standard has made itself especially apparent in
the domain of sexual activity.63 Adultery is the earliest and most widespread
rationale of divorce in the United States. Concededly, only a few divorce
codes explicitly differentiated the sexual activities of wives and provided for
marital dissolution upon only a wife’s adultery.64 In practice, however, the
sexual double standard was virtually universal. In courtrooms, women were

58

59
60

61

62
63

64

Indeed, the failure to meet sex-role obligations was the most common basis for Victorian divorce.
See generally ROBERT GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850–1890: VICTORIAN
ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES (1982); ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS:
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA (1980). See also Lindsey, supra note 56,
at 280; Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce
Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 634 (1997); Singer, supra note 50, at 1100–12.
Margaret Sokolov, Note, Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1974).
PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 226–27 (claiming that the gender-specific obligations of the marriage
contract were so central that failure to adhere to them provided a basis for divorce); Ariela R.
Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 963 (2000).
F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561,
574 (2001) (“[B]arriers to divorce facilitate the traditional homemaker/wage earner marriage
. . . .”); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and
Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 988, 1008 (1991).
William E. Nelson, Patriarchy or Equality: Family Values or Individuality, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 435,
514 (1996).
Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 503, 552 (1994) (criticizing the fault regime for being “too much based on now-obsolete ideas
about gender”); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason To Revive An Old Rule, 53
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 379 (2006) (arguing that the fault regime stigmatized both men and women,
portraying one as a “dishonorable villain” and the other as a “pathetic victim”); RHODE, supra note
6, at 27; Eric V. Wicks, Fault-Based Divorce “Reforms,” Archaic Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 WAYNE
L. REV. 1565, 1596 (2000) (claiming that fault divorce is based on archaic concepts of gender roles).
This was the case with Massachusetts’ divorce law, for example. See PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at
137–39, 147; RILEY, supra note 6, at 13.
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subject to much stricter standards of purity than men, both before and during
marriage.65 While a woman usually had to prove multiple male adulteries to
divorce her husband, a single act of female infidelity was generally enough to
set a man free.66 Stereotypes also abounded about men’s voracious sexual
appetites and about women’s reluctance to have sex.67 A wife who refused
sexual relations might be deemed in breach of the marriage contract and
could neither hold her husband to his duty of support nor liberate herself by
divorce.68 Indeed, ensuring husbands’ unrestricted access to their wives’
bodies was a keystone of the marital bargain that formed the blueprint for
the fault system.69 To give but one example of the extent and force of a
woman’s sexual duty, a late-nineteenth-century divorce case sketched a
marital reality in which the husband had recurrently imposed himself on his
wife, whose medical condition rendered sexual intercourse extremely
painful. However, the court failed to find these conjugal circumstances
sufficiently “grave and weighty” to warrant marital freedom.70
The gendered treatment of sexual appetites also came into play in the
judicial regulation of the condonation defense, commonly offered when
spouses continued to cohabit following adultery.71 For divorce courts, wives
65

66
67
68
69

70
71

For example, while courts found fault with a wife who had failed to disclose a previous pregnancy,
they did not in the case of a husband whose wife could establish his undisclosed prior sexual activity,
including impregnation a girl who bore him a child out of wedlock. See Yucabezky v. Yucabezky,
111 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1952); Pankiw v. Pankiw, 45 Misc. 2d 206 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe Cty. 1965); see also NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE
REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 170–71 (1999); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era,
82 GEO L.J. 2525, 2526 (1994) (showing that fault divorce has a history of abuse as it had been used
to reinforce stereotypes about women’s sexuality and to keep women in their place; the traditional
fault paradigm reflected an obsession with controlling women and their sexuality).
Singer, supra note 50, at 1111.
Friedman, supra note 53, at 1528.
See, e.g., Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. App. 1926).
The most blatant manifestation of this regime is the marital-rape exemption which still persists in
various forms in a majority of American jurisdictions. For a fascinating account of this regime, see
Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
See also COTT, supra note 49, at 66–67.
English v. English, 27 N.J. Eq. 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1876).
A party was said to have condoned the misconduct if the innocent petitioner appeared to have
forgiven the marital offense, as by moving back in with the spouse originally at fault. See John J.
King et al., Note, A Survey of the Law of Condonation, Connivance and Collusion in New England, 35 B.U. L.
REV. 99, 103 (1955). Even a single act of intercourse after the alleged misbehavior could be
construed as an attempt at reconciliation and could consequently bar a divorce. See, e.g., Hammer
v. Hammer, 309 N.E.2d 874, 874 (N.Y. 1974).
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as subordinate spouses could be understood, and even applauded, for
forgiving adultery and showing patient forbearance, while husbands who
sought to repair marital ties with unfaithful wives were penalized by being
denied divorce altogether.72
In addition, judges interpreted ostensibly gender-neutral legal authority
in ways that favored men over women and gave rise to intersectional gender
and class discrimination.73 For example, isolated incidents of violence by a
woman’s husband generally did not amount to legal cruelty,74 especially
when the violence was perceived as provoked by wifely scolding or
rudeness,75 and at times even “actual and repeated violence” was insufficient
to warrant female marital emancipation.76 As Reva Siegel aptly phrased it:
[J]udges developed a body of divorce law premised on the assumption that
a wife was obliged to endure various kinds of violence as a normal—and
sometimes deserved—part of married life. . . . [T]he evidence required to
prove “extreme cruelty” varied by class, on the doctrinally explicit
assumption that violence was a common part of life among the married
poor.77
72

73

74
75
76

77

Cahn, supra note 50, at 683 (noting the doctrine reaffirms the double sexual standard and women’s
subordination within marriage); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Edw. Ch. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)
(“[T]he effect of cohabitation as a condonation is less binding on a wife than it is on the husband:
because . . . she may entertain better hopes of the recovery and reform of her husband, her honor
is less injured and is more easily healed; and so far from its being improper that she should for a
time show a patient forbearance, it is commendable in her to exercise it, with a view to reclaim
him; which would not be tolerated in the husband where the wife should happen to be the
delinquent party. Besides, she may find a difficulty either in quitting his house or withdrawing from
his bed.”).
The judicial hostility to female marital freedom is apparent, for example, when comparing the
differential treatment accorded to domestic violence in the contexts of criminal law and divorce
law, respectively. Whereas for purposes of criminal law, the prevalence of domestic violence among
the “coarser” classes served to intensify the criminal prosecution of poor men, in the context of
divorce, judges viewed the prevalence of violence as a reason to limit, rather than expand, women’s
entitlement to marital freedom. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2134 (1996).
Id. at 2133 (explaining that to demonstrate that she was entitled to a divorce, a battered wife
typically had to prove that her husband acted with “extreme” and “repeated” cruelty).
RHODE, supra note 6, at 28.
See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 455, 459 (N.C. 1868); see also Davies v. Davies, 37 N.Y. 45
(N.Y. 1869) (using the defense of condonation to block a battered woman’s divorce petition). Even
though the husband had “choked [his wife]; committed severe personal violence upon her, and
struck her a blow with his fist upon the left temple, severing the temporal artery, and endangering
[her] life,” the Davies court found that the wife’s continued cohabitation “implie[d] a forgiveness of
such treatment” and held divorce unavailable “for such ill treatment, if in the interval, the
defendant had treated his wife kindly and given her no further cause of complaint.” Id. at 46, 48.
Siegel, supra note 73, at 2134.
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Divorce courts, therefore, often engaged in “close scrutiny” of female
petitioners in order to establish whether they possessed “the tender delicacy
of feeling that would be severely injured by verbal or mild physical abuse.”78
In marked contrast, a single violent act of a wife against her husband was
such a wrongdoing that she would be denied both separation and spousal
support.79
A review of nineteenth- and early-to-mid-twentieth-century divorce
cases not only reveals these double standards, but also exposes gendered
narratives about what it meant to be a “faulty” or “innocent” spouse,
transforming trial courts into a legal theater for the reaffirmation of
constraining sex roles.80 Given the absence of a clear violation of gendered
standards of performance that would suffice to establish a husband’s “guilt,”
marital freedom was often out of reach for many women. Consider, for
example, the 1926 case of Mrs. Sitterson’s husband who was convicted of
murder and sent to prison. After failing to hear from him for a decade, Mrs.
Sitterson eventually applied for divorce. The court refused to free her from
her own marital prison, however, because her husband’s absence was
involuntary; she would only be entitled to freedom if she could prove that he
had committed murder for the sake of fleeing his conjugal duties.81
The same themes emerged repeatedly in divorce trials, as judges
attempted, in the cogent words of Naomi Cahn, to “reinforce the authority
of men and restrict the autonomy of women, to make them victims of
conspiracies of men.”82 Indeed, judges insisted that a female petitioner
seeking liberation not only had to prove her husband’s fault, but also had to
78
79

80

81

82

Censer, supra note 55, at 35.
Axelrod v. Axelrod, 150 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1956); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C.
Stern, The Winding Road from Form to Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1, 11–12 (2008)
Fault rhetoric reinforced patriarchy and hierarchy in the institution of marriage and highlighted
the necessity of conforming with traditional gender roles. To win a divorce, husbands and wives
alike had to profess their compliance with gender norms while their opponents alleged their
noncompliance. As Naomi Cahn and others have concluded, the “cult of domesticity, together
with the virgin/whore dichotomy, were thriving in divorce rhetoric.” Cahn, supra note 50, at 661,
669–70, 673 (“Fault served to signal the policing of gender norms; fault constricted behavior and
punished women and men who transgressed.”); see also Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital
Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95, 97–98 (1991); VanSickle, supra note 7, at
158; Basch, supra note 34, at 12; BASCH, supra note 65, at 155.
Sitterson v. Sitterson, 131 S.E. 641 (N.C. 1926). For a modern incarnation of this case, see Scheu v.
Vargas, 778 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. 2004).
Cahn, supra note 50, at 673.
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persuade the court of her own virtue and impeccable innocence; the
appearance of chastity, respectability, morality, and female propriety thus
played a prominent role in determining whether a wife would be entitled to
marital release.83 If both spouses were guilty of marital wrongdoing,
however, they were believed to deserve each other, not a divorce. 84 Thus in
order to achieve a fault-based escape route, wives were frequently portrayed
as, and encouraged to play, innocent victims stripped of agency and with
injured femininity.85 So entrenched—and advantageous—was this role that
wives played the victim even when they conceded the charges against them
as defendants in divorce cases.86
Divorce courts especially celebrated “dutiful and obedient”87 wives,
rewarding their good behavior with a coveted divorce decree.88 Second only
to the wifely virtues of submissiveness and docility was domesticity, cited by
divorce courts as “sterling traits”89 essential for an innocent wife who showed

83
84

85

86

87
88

89

Censer, supra note 55, at 37–38; COTT, supra note 49, at 49.
This is the defense of recrimination. For examples of cases in which the doctrine of recrimination
was applied, see Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 557 So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d
1379 (1990). See also Schillaci v. Schillaci, 310 So.2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Maranto v.
Maranto, 297 So.2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Canning v. Canning, 443 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn.
App. 1968); Gundry v. Gundry, 136 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965). For a particularly absurd
example, see Kucera v. Kucera, 117 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1962).
As several commentators have argued, gender stereotypes mandate that women will almost always
appear as the victim of physical violence or psychological cruelty, whereas husbands play the role
of the abuser; women are chaste, loyal, and faithful, and husbands have large sexual appetites that
make them go astray; women occupy responsibilities of nurturing and homemaking in the domestic
sphere, while their husbands are in charge of bringing in the bacon and dominating the household.
See Friedman, supra note 53, at 1528–31 (“[D]ivorce law almost forced women into a posture of
submission and humility, into a mold of tender, injured femininity.”); VanSickle, supra note 7, at
170, 175; Kimberly Diane White, Covenant Marriage: An Unnecessary Second Attempt at Fault-Based
Divorce, 61 ALA. L. REV. 869, 878 (2010).
In one case, an adulteress claimed that God’s “strength has enabled me to confess the crime” to her
husband and ensured her “affections are again entirely” for her husband. Strong Divorce Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1865, at 8. In another case, the wife confessed to disclaimed responsibility for her
adultery because her seducer had exploited her “very feminine weakness in the face of male sexual
passion.” Cahn, supra note 50, at 679–80, 686.
Moyler v. Moyler, 11 Ala. 620 (Ala. 1847).
For example, in considering whether a wife was innocent enough to merit divorce, one court
observed that, despite the wife’s own fault, more importantly she “submitted in meekness, smiling
through her tears, to an almost continued flow of insult and unmerited contumely.” Rose v. Rose,
9 Ark. 507, 516 (Ark. 1849); see also Censer, supra note 55, at 38–39.
Censer, supra note 55, at 40 (noting that courts applauded wives who exhibited feminine capabilities
in domestic matters).
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herself to be “industrious, managing and attentive to her domestic duties.”90
So long as a wife abided by these conservative role expectations, both during
and after marriage, the fault system rewarded her with custody, marital
property, and lifetime alimony, thereby perpetuating marital gender roles
long after a marriage ended.91
Conversely, judges penalized disobedient women who challenged their
husbands’ authority by blocking marital freedom. Divorce courts construed
the arcane defense of recrimination—which provided that “divorce on the
ground of cruelty will not be granted if the ill treatment has been caused by
the misconduct of the plaintiff”—to bar claims by women whose conduct was
“incompatible with the duty of a wife” or who “justly provoke[d] the
indignation of the husband.”92 Wives who were “wanting of conformity” to
their husbands’ wishes were all met with judicial hostility.93 No matter how
egregious their husbands’ conduct, these “forward females” were punished
for their assertive behavior and deficient domesticity with the denial of their
pleas for freedom.94
Interestingly enough, normative assumptions about women’s agency and
roles figured especially prominently when husbands were the ones
petitioning for divorce. Husbands who sought to rid themselves of “unruly”
or “insubordinate” wives emphasized transgressions of womanly and wifely
expectations to sympathetic courts.95 In the famous case of Beardsley v.
90

91

92
93
94
95

Rose, 9 Ark. at 507; see also Robinson v. Robinson, 26 Tenn. (7 Humph.) 440 (Tenn. 1846); Censer,
supra note 55, at 38 (noting that judges favored well-bred and ladylike women, who were
domesticated and possessed economical, prudent, and industrious habits).
An “unchaste” or otherwise immoral ex-wife could forfeit her right to support. See, e.g., Taake v.
Taake, 70 Wis. 2d 115, 129 (Wis. 1975); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 71 (Md. 1971);
Daniels v. Daniels, 82 Idaho 201, 207 (Idaho 1960); Christiano v. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 597
(Conn. 1945); Annotation, Divorced Woman’s Subsequent Sexual Relations or Misconduct as Warranting,
Alone or With Other Circumstances, Modification of Alimony Decree, 98 A.L.R.3D 453 (1980 & Supp. 1986);
Singer, supra note 50, at 1109–11.
JOSEPH W. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 274
(1931).
Gray v. Gray, 15 Ala. 779 (Ala. 1849); Trowbridge v. Carlin, 12 La. Ann. 882 (La. 1857); Naulet
v. Dubois, 6 La. Ann. 403 (La. 1851).
See, e.g., Crow v. Crow, 23 Ala. 583 (Ala. 1853); Grey, 15 Ala. at 779; Trowbridge, 12 La. Ann. at 882;
Naulet, 6 La. Ann. at 403.
Censer, supra note 55, at 39–40 (noting that courts punished “stubbornness and insubordination”
in a wife, rebuking and denying her marital freedom); see also id. at 46 (explaining that judges looked
unfavorably upon assertive or managing wives who were “neither long-suffering nor submissive”).
Many cases vividly exhibit the gendered requirements of women to conform to their domestic roles
as guardians of the home and caretakers of children and to be docile, chaste, and submissive, in
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Beardsley, for example, the divorce-seeking husband ridiculed his wife’s
deficient domesticity, attacked her chastity by calling her “the most brazen
strumpet that ever defied God and men,” criticized her engagement in
activities that contravened “wifely propriety,” and noted her failure to greet
her husband “with the caresses which were his due . . . .”96 Tellingly, more
than eighty percent of the divorce grounds invoked by men in the nineteenth
century implied that wives had “refused to live up to the ideal of a submissive
subordination.”97
Even in the twentieth century, many husbands convinced courts to
permit them to discard wives who failed to perform household tasks,
discipline the children, follow husbands to places of their sole choosing, or
who otherwise flouted male authority.98 For example, in one mid-twentiethcentury divorce case, the court found a wife—a college graduate who
intended to pursue medical school—it deemed “a very ambitious lady” to
have constructively abandoned her husband because he was not satisfied
with the amount of attention she dedicated to their child.99 The court
predicated its ruling on gendered prescriptions for women: “The father has
a right to expect the mother to give the child that which is necessary for her
development and good, as it is his duty to provide the means to effectuate
that, both materially and in cooperation spiritually.”100 In so doing, courts
adjudicating fault actively enacted and enforced family relations in ways that
entrenched the traditional division of labor premised upon gender
differentiation.

96
97

98

99
100

order to avoid financial ruin. See ROBERT GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA, 1800–1900, at 21 (1986); E. Teitelbaum, Cruelty Divorce Under New York's Reform Act: On
Repeating Ancient Error, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 28 (1974); RHODE, supra note 6, at 28; Carbone & Brinig,
supra note 61, at 997–98. For one of the more extreme cases of judicial requiring of wifely obedience,
see Fulton v. Fulton, 31 Miss. 154 (Miss. 1858).
ROBERT M. DEWITT, REPORT OF THE BEARDSLEY DIVORCE CASE 71, 73, 75–76 (1860).
PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 228 (quoting CARL DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA (1980)). Such grounds were adultery and desertion, which were at odds with the image
of the Victorian wife, as well as cruelty, drunkenness, and failure to perform domestic duties. Id.
Bennett v. Bennett, 79 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1951); CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE
TALK: WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 55 (1990) (noting that a
quarter of late-twentieth-century divorced men cited their wives’ failure at performing the role of a
homemaker, complaining about their wives’ deficient skills at maintaining the house and for being
lazy, “sloppy,” and “disorganized.”); Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 28.
Rosner v. Rosner, 108 N.Y.S.2d 196, 200 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens Cty. 1951).
Id. at 201.
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Divorce courts not only imposed norms of chastity, domesticity, and
dependency on women, but simultaneously held men to a set of different, yet
still constraining, gender role prescriptions.101 Divorce trials stressed the
expectations that husbands serve as providers and protectors of their wives.102
Accordingly, many state laws traditionally contained “nonsupport” or
“neglect of duty” as a female divorce ground, and many courts construed
cruelty to include a husband’s failure to provide financial support.103 By
complaining about their partners’ deficient breadwinning skills, numerous
women—but certainly no men—won marital freedom.104
In conclusion, fault divorce encouraged—even required—genderconscious justifications for divorce that were explicitly or implicitly
contingent on longstanding prescriptions about women’s normative roles.
By making divorce available only when one spouse transgressed traditional
marital roles and the other strictly embraced them, the judicial application
of fault grounds enforced the very gendered stereotypes now repudiated by
the Supreme Court's equal-protection jurisprudence.105 Further, the fault
system, as we have seen, cultivated an image of feminine frailty and
dependence and construed the court’s duty to protect female “victims.” The
Supreme Court now understands the Constitution to forbid paternalism of
this kind: the state may not use laws to “reinforce[] stereotypes about the
‘proper place’ of women and their need for special protection.”106 As Reva
Siegel elucidates, gender-paternalism triggers equal-protection concerns
101

102
103

104

105

106

As Cahn observed, the “ideology of masculinity served as a critical balance to the ideology of
femininity; domesticity (and marriage) depended on both the husband and wife performing their
roles.” Cahn, supra note 50, at 674–75.
VanSickle, supra note 7, at 172; see also Cahn, supra note 50, at 674–75 (explaining that the divorce
cases reveal an emphasis on a husband’s economic success as a defining factor in his marital success).
SUZANNE M. BIANCHI & DAPHNE SPAIN, AMERICAN WOMEN IN TRANSITION 141 (1986); Biondi,
supra note 7, at 616; DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 79, at 14–15; Charles W. Tenney Jr., Divorce
Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 25 (1967) (noting that a husband’s neglect to provide
“suitable maintenance” was a recognized fault ground in numerous American jurisdictions).
See, e.g., Smedley v. Smedley, 30 Ala. 714 (Ala. 1857) (stating that a husband’s failure to perform his
legal duty of adequately supporting his wife constitutes cruelty); see also Cahn, supra note 50, at 675;
Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender,
41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 281 (2000).
Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 996 (2007) (noting that the equal-protection cases prohibit the use of law
to entrench family roles rooted in separate spheres ideology, “not simply because this use of law
restricts individual opportunity but also because it enforces group inequality”).
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–
25 (1982).
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where other forms of paternalism do not, because of the denigrating
assumptions about women such legislation reflects and the injuries it
facilitates.107 Indeed, in the name of “protecting” women, a large body of
law served to constrict female potential, limiting their involvement in the
public and civic life of the nation.108 The fault regime exerted the same effect;
by casting women into inferior and subservient roles, fault divorce facilitated
the transformation of women into “wedlocked wives” and substantially
subverted gender equality in society.
B. From Past to Present: Faulting Fault Divorce in Contemporary Courtrooms
The fault grounds still on the books in the twenty-first century are, to a
considerable extent, relics of the nineteenth-century legislation we have
discussed—laws enacted by all-male legislatures chosen by all-male
electorates that restricted women’s choices without earning their votes.
Remarkably, more than half of U.S. jurisdictions feature a mixed-ground
dissolution regime that offers both newer no-fault grounds as well as
traditional fault grounds which still permit judges to evaluate marital
misconduct and spousal wrongdoing.109 For example, New York did not
permit unilateral fault-free dissolutions until as late as the second decade of
the twenty-first century, when the legislature supplemented the existing faultbased menu with a no-fault divorce ground.110 In these mixed-ground

107

108

109

110

Siegel, supra note 105, at 1049. For example, in Hogan, the state policy of limiting nursing school to
female students was constitutionally impermissible because it perpetuated a stereotypical view of
nursing as the sole province of women. See Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause:
Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 803 (1986).
For example, a law preventing women from practicing law attempted to “‘sav[e]’ women because
they are women from a combative, aggressive profession . . . .” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (emphasis in original).
Evan Wright, Agree to Disagree: Moving Tennessee Toward Pure No-Fault Divorce, 4 LINCOLN MEMORIAL
U. L. REV. 86, 97–98 (2017) (showing that only seventeen states adopted a pure no-fault divorce
system); Judith Areen, Uncovering the Reformation Roots of American Marriage and Divorce Law, 26 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 30–31 (2014) (“[S]ome divorcing spouses prefer to rely on a fault ground . . . .
Litigants and courts in most states thus still wrestle with how best to interpret and to apply divorce
requirements that were formulated centuries ago.”).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (2010). Before the 2010 reform, no-fault was possible only upon
mutual consent. Given both the stringency of the proof required for establishing the fault-grounds
and the ease with which defenses could defeat these grounds, a New York citizen often faced the
risk of remaining chained to indissoluble marriage in the pre-reform era. See Rhona Bork, Taking
Fault With New York’s Fault-Based Divorce: Is the Law Constitutional?, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
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jurisdictions, roughly one third of divorces still proceed through the faultbased system.111 There are still, however, two American jurisdictions which
have consistently resisted unilateral no-fault divorce reform efforts, where
fault grounds continue to dominate.112 This is also true of covenant marriage
legislation which has been passed in three jurisdictions and proposed in more
than a dozen others—the first Western laws in some two hundred years to
make divorce more difficult to obtain.113
Certainly, fault divorce today is no longer implemented in as stereotypical
a manner as it used to be, and most judges do not consciously discriminate
against women.114 Nevertheless, the fault regime remains susceptible to
equal-protection challenges and, as this Part argues, it is still applied, at least
occasionally, in ways that enforce inequitable gender relations. Mainstream
equal-protection analysis subjects to rigorous judicial review not only sexbased legislative classifications, but also legislation neutral on its face yet
enforced in a discriminatory manner.115 As the Supreme Court has

111

112
113

114

115

165, 168–79 (2002); see also J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform
Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559 (2007).
Karen Turnage Boyd, The Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce Laws Can Remedy the Unintended
Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 609, 616 (2006); see also Pamela LauferUkeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 209 (2010) (“[F]ault
or blameworthy conduct is persistently relevant, whether as an option in divorce statutes, as a
bargaining mechanism, or to gain advantage in financial and custodial matters.”); Areen, supra note
109, at 31.
These states are Mississippi and Tennessee. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (effective Mar. 31, 2020);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103 (effective Mar. 6, 2020).
See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-901; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-801; see also
Heather Flory, “I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey . . . and Not Divorce You”: Covenant Marriage and the Backlash
Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 FAM. L.Q. 133, 133–34 (2000); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 107 (1998).
This is part of the decline in moral discourse in family law as chronicled in Carl Schneider’s
influential articles. See Schneider, supra note 63; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–44 (1993) (tracing the history of equal-protection litigation to
illustrate that facially neutral legislation may also be subject to strict scrutiny when applied in a
racially discriminatory basis.); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (explaining that
challenges to multimember voting districts violate the Equal Protection Clause if “conceived or
operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination”) (internal citation omitted); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (noting that while multimember legislative districts are
not per se unconstitutional, such schemes could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose
were to “minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities”); see also Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (“Sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even
when the . . . legislation appears neutral on its face.”); Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
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acknowledged, “a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation.”116 Insofar as fault grounds are informed by
the sex-role prescriptions of the separate-spheres tradition and remain
susceptible to sexist implementation, they are unacceptable even under the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the antidiscrimination principle.
Indeed, there is an inherent danger embedded in a divorce regime based
on evaluations of marital fault since, as Laurence Tribe cautions, laws and
institutions to this day “still promote—with vast popular support—distinctive
and restrictive gender roles,” such that some gender classifications are so
woven into the entire social understanding of women that they reflect “what
the judiciary itself still perceives as a genuine gender difference.”117
Especially in this psychologically loaded context of marital dissolution,
“discretion permits the judge’s own bias, reflecting his own place in the
patriarchy, to serve as the unexamined predicate for his decision. Divorce is
governed not by law, but quite literally by the men who comprise the vast
majority of family court judges . . . .”118
An examination of contemporary fault-based divorce cases confirms
these suspicions. Divorce judges themselves candidly concede that their

116

117

118

U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (explaining that legislation that includes a racial classification or that is facially
neutral but is “an obvious pretext for racial discrimination” will survive a legal challenge “only
upon extraordinary justification”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1483 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the actions of state courts and judicial officers are subject to the
restraints of the equal protection clause); Eppler, supra note 107, at 796–97 (“[E]xtreme
discrimination in the administration of a facially neutral law may provide proof of discriminatory
intent.”).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 & n.11 (1956). Indeed, serious discrimination in the
administration of a gender-neutral law may provide proof of discriminatory purpose. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not
be applied so as invidiously to discriminate . . . .”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886));
see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 709 (10th ed. 1980) (“[P]urposeful, hostile
discrimination is inferred from data regarding administration of a facially neutral law.”).
See TRIBE, supra note 115, at 1569, 1571. This is a fair conclusion given that gender stereotypes
may still affect even the nation’s highest court. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78–79
(1981) (upholding a federal law limiting to men the duty to register for a military draft); Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466–73 (1981) (upholding a California statutory rape law
punishing the young man but not the young woman for voluntary sexual intercourse); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (reinforcing the stereotypic view of women as vulnerable sex
objects by upholding a law forbidding women to serve as guards in a maximum security prison for
men).
Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 1483, 1519 (1991) (footnote omitted).
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personal philosophies and prejudices affect their divorce decisions,119 and
even female judges are known to act upon stereotyped myths, beliefs, and
biases.120 State task forces investigating gender bias in late twenty-century
divorce courts have all reported that “gender bias detrimental to women
permeates every aspect of marital dissolution.”121 Divorce scholars have
similarly found that courts have exhibited “a double standard for women and
men in fault behaviors”122 and are still “more willing to find fault with women
than men for the same conduct.”123
Many judges still adhere to dated notions of appropriate gender behavior
particularly when adjudicating the financial and custodial consequences of
fault-based dissolution.124 In a 1991 case, for example, a court denied
119

120
121

122

123

124

RICHARD NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE HUMAN AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ENDING A MARRIAGE 27–28, 32 (1984) (discussing how the author, a divorce judge himself,
cautions that “judges are human, and their decisions are influenced by their backgrounds,
experiences, and—unfortunately—prejudices”); Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern
Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 787 n.32 (1996) (noting that to this day many states attach far
more consequences to a wife’s adultery than a husband’s); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman’s Constitution,
1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 468 (1984) (suggesting that lawmakers are influenced by the “traditional
construct of woman” as wife and mother when making rules that impact gender roles).
Singer, supra note 50, at 1119 (noting that divorce judges who are women do not typically have
experience with divorce and are not immune to the gender biases of their male counterparts).
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181, 187 (1990); see
also Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1
(1990) (noting that every study conducted by states and state court systems exploring gender bias in
the judicial system has found a need for reform in order to eliminate the impact of gender bias on
judicial processes and decision-making).
Susan Hager, Comment, Nostalgic Attempts to Recapture What Never Was: Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage
Act, 77 NEB. L. REV. 567, 582 (1998) (noting that courts more readily conclude that a woman is at
fault and less able to perform parental responsibilities than men under identical circumstances); see
also Bradford, supra note 58, at 634 (describing the different consequences in divorce proceedings
for men and women who commit adultery); Lucinda M. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal
Protection Clause: Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429, 431 (2004) (comparing the severity of social consequences for men
and women who abandon their children or bear children out of wedlock); MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM
72 (1991) (concluding that judges could not as a group be trusted to protect wives and children).
Lindsey, supra note 56, at 281; see also RIANE TENNENHAUS EISLER, DISSOLUTION: NO-FAULT
DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 136, 190 (1977); FINEMAN, supra note 122,
at 72 (noting the belief among advocates of divorce reform that trial judges exhibited patterns of
bias against women); Singer, supra note 50, at 1111 (discussing examples of women’s exposure to
harsher penalties than men for the same behaviors).
It should be stressed that my analysis, which espouses a unilateral no-fault right in access to
divorce, is limited to the core right to marital exit but does not address the regulation of the incidents
of divorce. The latter category, which introduces complexities of its own and is still a source of
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alimony and provided only limited property to a severely ill and needy
woman because she had begun an extramarital relationship after separating
from her husband.125 In the same vein, modern divorce courts have been
often guided by double standards for sexual behavior and work priorities in
resolving custody battles.126 While women’s perceived “promiscuity” may
cost them custody of their children,127 as affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court,128 the very same conduct from men “rarely disables” their custody

125

126

127

128

contention among feminists, is beyond the scope of this article and is analyzed in a separate work.
Yefet, supra note 35; see also, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don't Let Divorce off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2006, at 14LL (calling for “a prudent and realistic search for new approaches to enacting
our shared moral understanding of marriage”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Beyond the Bounds of Decency:
Why Fault Matters to (Some) Wronged Spouses, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 503 (2009); Harry Krause,
On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault Torts to Re-Emerge in the Guise of Torts, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1355 (2003); see also Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 111 (observing that feminists still “have mixed feelings
about fault divorce”).
Rgm v. Dem, 410 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1991); see also Woodhouse & Bartlett, supra note 65, at 2557–
58; Ellman, supra note 119, at 787, n.32 (“[M]any states . . . attach far more consequence to a wife’s
adultery than a husband’s.”).
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Taylor, 274 P.3d 46 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding, in part, decision
to grant custody to father, inter alia, because of the mother’s claims that the judge’s comments and
journal entry reflected “a personal and gender bias” against her; for example, the court mentioned
that shortly after the divorce she became pregnant out of wedlock by a man she had not known for
long while applying “a double standard of morality” that held her to a higher standard than the
father); see also Schafran, supra note 6, at 42–43 (discussing how women seeking custody may be
punished for life-styles and social arrangements that are acceptable for men); Schafran, supra note
121, at 192 (explaining that mothers are held to a different and higher standard of parenting and
personal behavior than fathers). For the traditional operation of this regime, see HOMER H. CLARK
JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 585 (1968) ("[T]he commonest case [is], where the divorce is
granted for the wife’s adultery. Some courts have been unduly rigid in refusing to give the wife
custody where it appeared quite clearly that the child would be better off in her care.").
See, e.g., Stibich v. Stibich, 2016 Ark. App. 251, 491 S.W.3d 475 (Ark. App 2016) (living with a
boyfriend out of wedlock warranted a change in custody); Chastain v. Chastain, 672 S.E.2d 108
(S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that “flagrant promiscuity” is a relevant factor in determining the
moral fitness of a parent—in this case the mother—to raise a child); Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d
1190 (Ala. 1998) (reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirming the trial court’s
order granting a change of custody from mother to father based on her open lesbian relationship
and given that “the father and the stepmother have established a two-parent home environment
where heterosexual marriage is presented as the moral and societal norm”); Collins v. Collins, No.
87-238-II,1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (affirming the trial court's decision to
award custody to the remarried father because of the mother’s “gay lifestyle”); see also RHODE, supra
note 6, at 189 (explaining that “promiscuity” is frequently cited as grounds for custody challenges);
Bradford, supra note 58, at 634 (finding that courts frequently rule that women accused of adultery
or promiscuity cannot provide an acceptable home for children).
See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 449 U.S. 927 (1980) (custody was changed from mother to father because
of ex-wife’s subsequent nonmarital relationship).
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petitions.129 Consider the 2018 case Cordell v. Cordell, in which the court
ordered a change of custody from mother to father based, inter alia, on the
mother’s “immoral conduct” in dating a married man.130 The court
concluded that “[i]f there's any hope that the children are raised with any
morals it will have to be with . . . [the father],” notwithstanding the father’s
previous engagement in similar activities.131 Divorce courts have also been
known to prefer fathers who admit to having been serial adulterers to
mothers in stable lesbian relationships; one court even found it superior to
award custody to a father convicted of murder than to a lesbian mother.132
Fault determinations especially risk penalizing women who defy
traditional gender paths or who lack proper housekeeping standards.133 In
D.H. v. J.H, for instance, the court awarded custody to the father because of
the mother’s failure to be “a model housekeeper” given that dishes were left
unwashed and laundry was left lying on furniture while the husband had to
fix meals for the children because “the wife was out running around.”134
Working mothers, in particular, may still be viewed with suspicion by many
family court judges.135 Women’s widespread participation in the labor force
129

130
131
132
133

134
135

Bradford, supra note 58, at 634; see also, e.g., Alphin v. Alphin, 219 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Ark. 2005)
(affirming a trial court order changing custody from mother to father by relying primarily on the
“illicit sexual relationship” between the mother and her new husband prior to their marriage, which
the court viewed as “nothing but a ruse,” while ignoring both similar conduct by the father—who
married his girlfriend when she was three months pregnant with his child—and the fact that the
father initiated the change-of-custody petition only after the mother sought child support from him).
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision based on the mother’s “lack of stability”: she
moved frequently and did not have a fixed schedule because of her job which meant that on some
nights only her mother was able to be home at her child’s bedtime. In contrast, the Court was
impressed with the father’s new wife for making “a point of leaving work every day in time” to pick
up the child. Id. at 166; see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 341 (noting an exception to this rule when
the father is accused of homosexual conduct); Hanna Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and
Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J 94, 124–25 (1988)
(noting that judges tend to deprive homosexuals of custody).
Cordell v. Cordell, 565 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018).
Id. at 506.
For a description of such relatively recent cases, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 189.
See Bradford, supra note 58, at 621; see also Biondi, supra note 7, at 611, 623–24 (“[F]ault-based
divorce laws ultimately rely on inconsistent and subjective family court judges to define fault.
Further, these definitions may be influenced inappropriately by biological and cultural assumptions
about women and their proper social and familial roles.”) (footnotes omitted).
D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
See Czapanskiy, supra note 121, at 4 (noting that judges have found mothers who work unfit for
custody and sometimes require more evidence for a female litigant to prove her custodial fitness
than for a male litigant).
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notwithstanding, mothers who challenge traditional gender roles by
appearing career-focused or relying on daycare may risk losing custody.136
Going before divorce judges, women are in a bind: they are viewed as
incapable of being good parents if they work “too much,” but as incapable
of supporting their children if they don’t work “enough.”137 Husbands,
however, are seldom faulted for being “overly” committed to their careers,
and they tend to be rewarded by judges “for any small effort made to
participate actively in their child’s life, while [judges] view similar behavior
by women as routine.”138
The gendered faults of fault divorce do not end here. Perhaps the most
troubling phenomenon in contemporary courtrooms is the minimization of
domestic violence allegations in divorce proceedings.139 Many battered
women who experienced various forms of abuse were thus found wanting,
and failed to surmount the court-defined barrier of “cruel and inhuman
treatment” that warrants marital freedom.140 In Palin v. Palin, for example,
the wife proved that she was both physically and verbally abused by her
husband yet the court deemed this marital misconduct as nothing more than
136

137
138

139

140

See Bradford, supra note 58, at 634 (noting that several well-publicized custody battles have involved
attempts to take children away from mothers who use daycare or who are supposedly too
committed to their careers to spend “enough” time at home); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 189–
93 (describing cases in which mothers were denied custody because judges did not believe they
could raise children and work or pursue an education); Schafran, supra note 6, at 56 (describing
cases that show that women experienced difficulties in securing judicial permission to relocate with
their children for work-related reasons while custodial fathers were generally permitted to move for
job opportunities).
RHODE, supra note 6, at 192–93; CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 40, at 157.
Bradford, supra note 58, at 634–35 (explaining that the presence of a second wife, mother, or even
a hired housekeeper to care for the child in the father’s life may tip the scales in his favor in a
custody battle); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 189–90 (noting that fathers are praised for successful
careers, while mothers may be cast as selfish for taking on work outside of the home).
Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question, supra note 7, at 727; see also Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 183 (1992) (discussing a North
Carolina study finding that allegations of paternal abuse of wives or children seldom affected
judicial custody decisions); Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory,
24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 565 (2010) (“The belief that women make false
accusations of abuse to win custody or divorce lawsuits, or simply as an act of vindictiveness, is
commonplace in the justice system’s treatment of domestic violence.”).
See, e.g., E.D. v. M.D., 801 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Cochran v. Cochran, 912 So.
2d 1086, 1090–91 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Ladner v. Ladner, 49 So. 3d 669, 672 (Miss. Ct. App.
2010); see also S.K. v. I.K., No. 203247-2008, 2010 WL 1371943, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29,
2010). For further discussion of such cases, see Lauren Guidice, New York and Divorce: Finding Fault
in a No Fault System, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 787, 801–04 (2011).
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“unpleasant.”141 The court also held her continued cohabitation with her
husband against the wife, thereby turning a blind eye to the feminization of
poverty that plagues many women's economic ability to physically separate
from their abusers.142 The same fate awaited Mrs. Gross, whose husband of
thirty-seven years rammed her up against the walls of the house and imposed
himself on her sexually. Mrs. Gross’s pleas for marital emancipation fell on
deaf ears, however, since “[r]eprehensible and highly offensive behavior . . .
is not necessarily sufficient to establish the cruel-and-inhuman-treatment
ground for divorce.”143 The New York Court of Appeals further added insult
to injury by stressing that the lengthier the marriage, the higher the degree
of proof required to set a divorce-seeker free.144
Moreover, it is still a common misconception that so-called vindictive
women make such allegations simply to gain an advantage in negotiation or
at trial,145 and judges with these beliefs sometimes deprive women of custody
if they make such allegations.146 Some judges also view battered women who
escaped the marital home to a protected shelter as unfit mothers for
abandoning their children.147
141
142
143
144
145

146

147

Palin v. Palin, 624 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding that the trial court erred by
determining that the wife was entitled to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment).
See id. at 632.
Gross v. Gross, 836 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2007).
See id. (reversing the lower court's decision to grant a divorce).
Elizabeth Mertz & Kimberly A. Lonsway, The Power of Denial: Individual and Cultural Constructions of
Child Sexual Abuse, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1415, 1454 (1998); see also Joan S. Meier, Notes from the
Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1307–08 (1993) (“[C]ustody courts routinely reject battered womans’ [sic]
claims of abuse as fabrications, exaggerations, or irrelevant to the welfare of the children.”).
Rita Berg, Parental Alienation Analysis, Domestic Violence, and Gender Bias in Minnesota Courts, 29 L. &
INEQ. 5 (2011) (noting anti-mother gender bias in the Minnesota legal system and concluding that
mothers may be unfairly prevented from attaining custody of their children when alleging domestic
violence); Megan Shipley, Reviled Mothers: Custody Modification Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 86 IND.
L.J. 1587, 1588 (2011) (describing courts’ tendencies to “disbelieve or minimize mothers’ accounts
of domestic violence”); Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question, supra note 7, at 728 (discussing cases in
which mothers lose custody after alleging abuse by their children’s fathers); Susan Beth Jacobs, The
Hidden Gender Bias Behind “the Best Interest of the Child” Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 845, 858 (1997) (noting that courts’ failure to recognize the “inherent immorality” of fathers
who abuse mothers “result[s] in an increasing number of mothers who are losing custody of their
children”).
MICH. SUP. CT., FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER
ISSUES IN THE COURTS 64, 69 (1989) (reporting task force findings showing that women who leave
abusive husbands may be disadvantaged in custody proceedings); Bryan, Reasking the Woman
Question, supra note 7, at 727 (“Judges sometimes deprive battered women of custody when they flee
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To conclude, examining past regulatory practices can illuminate tacit
forms of bias structuring present regulatory practices. Given the fault
system’s historical function as a form of gender-caste regulation, it is not
surprising that the adjudication of fault, at least occasionally, may still be
influenced by status-based reasoning about women’s roles and identities.
Since fault-based divorce may continue to facilitate gender-based
decisionmaking, even a divorce regime that is structured around formal
equality must center on a no-fault concept that does not mandate conformity
to or transgression of conservative gender ideologies.148 No-fault grounds, in
contrast, present women with the opportunity to leave relationships that are
confining and subordinating without having to confront—or profess
adherence to—gender stereotypes, biases, and inequalities.149 Moreover, by
guaranteeing rights of exit to spouses who do not conform to dated moral
standards or traditional gender roles, no-fault divorce also contributes to degendering marriage and affords spouses a meaningful choice to pursue
egalitarian ideals during their relationship.150 Finally, no-fault economic
rules reconstruct the marital bargain and promote a more egalitarian sharing
of marital responsibilities by withdrawing support for the traditional
exchange of male support for female services and protection for obedience.151

148

149

150

151

the marital home without the children.”); Meier, supra note 145, at 1310 (noting that women
involved in custody disputes are often accused of abandoning their families and denied custody as
a result).
Apart from facilitating discriminatory divorces mired with gender stereotyping, the fault system also
erects substantial barriers for victims of domestic violence. See Bell, supra note 6. In contrast, a 2006
study of the impact of unilateral no-fault divorce found “a striking decline in female suicide and
domestic violence rates arising from the advent of unilateral divorce.” See Betsey Stevenson & Justin
Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 267, 286
(2006).
See Cahn, supra note 50, at 695 (“Under the no-fault system in contemporary law, the norms of
gendered marital behavior are irrelevant to receiving a no-fault divorce.”); see also Jana B. Singer,
The Privatization of Family Law, WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1518 (1992) (noting that no-fault divorce is an
alternative to a system that was “rife with gender stereotypes and inequalities”); VanSickle, supra
note 7, at 174 (noting that a no-fault regime empowers women as the primary initiators of divorce).
COTT, supra note 49, at 206 (explaining that no-fault divorce signifies that the state is barred from
“passing judgment on performance in an ongoing marriage and allow the partners to decide
whether their behavior matched their own expectations . . . .”); Elizabeth Baker et al., Covenant
Marriage and the Sanctification of Gendered Marital Roles, 30 J. FAM. ISSUES 147, 152 (2009) (“The
weakening of social norms and expectations that govern spouses’ behavior allows wives and
husbands more freedom to negotiate the gendered terms of their marriages.”) (internal citations
omitted).
No-fault treats women not as the dependents of male earners but as fully capable of labor force
participation and supporting themselves. See, e.g., Carbone & Brinig, supra note 61, at 961–62
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In all these ways, a no-fault path to marital emancipation operates to
dismantle the gender hierarchy fostered by marriage and serves as a
counterforce against the reification of sex-role stereotypes. In short, a right
to no-fault divorce is a bedrock component of equal citizenship for women
even given the narrow and formal confines of the antidiscrimination
principle.
III. TURNING BACK THE PATRIARCHAL CLOCK: THE NEW-OLD AGENDA
TO RESTRICT DIVORCE
A number of states are currently considering proposals that seek, among
other restrictive regulations, to eliminate no-fault grounds and restore fault
as the exclusive basis for divorce.152 Like their historical predecessors, many
legislators endeavoring to reinstate fault today view liberal divorce rights as
facilitating derogations of wifely duties and female obedience.153 Put

152

153

(explaining how the no-fault movement has disrupted gender roles by “adjusting the incentives for
marital behavior”); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 40, at 112–13 (arguing that no-fault divorce
contributed to the dismantling of a marital model that enforced women’s economic dependence on
men); Fineman, supra note 40, at 853–67. Indeed, no-fault divorce has had a “major impact” on
women’s employment. See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 114, at 1809; Ann L. Estin,
Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 523 (1995); Lindsey, supra
note 56, at 280.
The most recent proposal, backed by the Coalition for Divorce Reform, is a South Dakota House
Bill to remove no-fault divorce that was introduced by South Dakota State Representative Tony
Randolph on January 29, 2020. See H.R.1158, 2020 Leg. (S.D. 2020); see also Yefet, supra note 35,
at ch. I. For an instructive summary of the multifaceted critiques against the no-fault divorce
revolution and the calls for a counter-revolution that espouse a return to a fault-based regime, see
Ayelet Hoffmann Libson, Not My Fault: Morality and Divorce Law in the Liberal State, 93 TUL. L. REV.
599, 607–614, 642 (2019) (calling for a “hybrid model of fault in divorce law” that assigns marital
misconduct a prominent role in determining post-divorce outcomes). Lynn Wardle, writing at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, elucidates:
The intensity and breadth of the dissatisfaction with the current regime of unilateral nofault divorce is so great that it has been described as a ‘counter-revolution’ against no-fault
divorce . . . . [C]ommentators and politicians across the country decry the loss of ‘family
values’ and urge legislative and social reform to bring back the traditional family . . . [This]
very significant divorce reform in the United States at the present time . . . is likely to
continue to be a major social force in the coming decade.
Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q.
783, 794, 799 (2000) (internal citation omitted). Wardle further observes that “it appears that there
is a significant, widespread, and growing social movement to reform unilateral no-fault divorce
laws.” Id. at 784.
Indeed, to this day, the wife who seeks divorce and walks out of “her” domestic responsibilities may
be viewed as “the psychological equivalent of the mother who abandons; she is a monster.” Stark,
supra note 118, at 1509; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER
INEQUALITY 185 (1999) (stating that sponsors of fault divorce seek to restrain “walkaway wives,” as
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differently, as related by this Part, there is much evidence to suggest that
legislators attempting to enact restrictions on divorce may be seeking to
“save” not just marriage in general, but patriarchal marriage in particular,
in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Though the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
prohibit government from enforcing gender-differentiated marital roles,154
this vision of the family, and of government’s role in protecting it, still
remains attractive to many. Opponents of divorce have recognized the
connection between the right to marital freedom and the social, economic,
and psychological emancipation of women, and they have linked their
opposition to divorce to their support for the “primacy of the husband with
regard to the wife and children, and the ready subjection of the wife and her
willing obedience.”155
A major backer of the contemporary movement to limit divorce is the
American marriage movement, a loosely-organized coalition of conservative
social critics, religious traditionalists, and academics that seek to strengthen
the traditional family and enforce gender-specific marital roles.156 For

154

155

156

women who are the ones who overwhelmingly initiate divorce). While calls to restrict divorce
certainly also rest on benign and even commendable interests such as protecting the welfare of
children, this is not enough to neutralize prejudiced motives. The Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the proposition that the existence of an allegedly permissible motive “trumps any proof of
a parallel impermissible motive.” Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985).
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 105, at 997 (“The case law treats laws that enforce gender-differentiated
family roles, regardless of whether they purport to protect women, as enforcing an illegitimate form
of stereotyping or caste resembling race discrimination.”).
J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 32 (1997) (quoting POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL
LETTER: ON CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 21–64 (1931)); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE
DIVORCE CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 105 (1998)
(“Many liberal academics fear that raising concerns about the hardships of divorce for children may
play into the hands of the political right. ‘Family values’ conservatives, they believe, are intent on
driving women back into traditional homemaking roles and even dangerously abusive marriages,
thus undermining women’s considerable progress toward freedom from domestic misery and
tyranny.”).
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 293 (2006) (“Too often, defenses of ‘traditional’
marriage and family values regard gains in women’s equality and personal self-government as being
in tension with strengthening families.”); Norland, supra note 33, at 322 (suggesting the American
Marriage Movement was inspired in part by “political backlash against the rights of women”);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Divorce, Children’s Welfare, and the Culture Wars, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 107–
08 (2001) (noting that divorce reform proposals are part of a “reactionary social agenda being
promoted by those who would like to return to traditional marriage and gender roles”); Singer,
supra note 50, at 1104 (“[T]he perceived attack on no-fault divorce and on equality-based divorce
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marriage movement members, divorce rights “threaten to destroy the
sanctuary once provided by the father-dominated, home-centered, motherdependent, traditional family.”157 Many traditionalists thus expressly
criticize no-fault for being inimical to specialization within the family—
especially men’s engagement in paid employment and women’s focus on
domestic and caretaking work158—and couch their stance with sexist rhetoric
on women’s traditional roles and the wifely duty to obey.159 Accordingly,
many promote limitations on divorce in order to restore the “patriarchal
hierarchical structure and sharply differentiated gender roles” of traditional
marriage.160
Even reformers who disclaim any desire to “turn back the clock” still
blame the weakening of marriage on “feminism, women’s increasing

157

158

159

160

reform threatens to reinforce old stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women and to fuel
public nostalgia for a return to the ‘good old days’ (before women’s liberation) when fathers worked,
mothers stayed home, and virtuous parents never got divorced.”).
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law
in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2091 (2000); see also MCCLAIN,
supra note 156.
Through reforming no-fault divorce laws into stricter laws, marriage promoters seek to reward
investment in domestic activities in order to persuade women that specializing in household work
and childcare is not a risky endeavor. See Maggie Gallagher, Re-Creating Marriage, in PROMISES TO
KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 233–45 (David Popenoe et al. eds.,
1996); Allen M. Parkman, Good Incentives Lead to Good Marriages, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION
OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 69, 72–77 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002)
(“Traditionally, spouses were reluctant to make sacrifices associated with specializing in domestic
activities during marriage unless they had the expectation of a long-term relationship; marriage was
associated with that expectation.”); Carbone & Brinig, supra note 61, at 988 (explaining that
traditionalists favor a contract approach to marriage that encourages specialization within the
marriage by imposing financial penalties on the spouse who initiates divorce (the “at-fault” spouse));
Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV.
879, 889 (1988) (noting that under no-fault regimes, couples internalize the fragility of the marital
partnership and act as if their marriage is fragile, which may actually cause the relationship to be
fragile).
White, supra note 85, at 880–81 (noting that some religions promote women’s subservience to men
and discourage divorce, even when the husband is abusive). For example, some Christian and
Muslim leaders, who advocate legal restrictions on divorce, instruct husbands, as the heads of their
households, to employ domestic violence to discipline women rather than divorce them, and direct
wives to endure the abuse and save their marriage “at all costs”; indeed, they are told that their
“lack of submissive behavior” is “in part responsible for the violence.” Colleen Shannon-Lewy &
Valerie T. Dull, The Response of Christian Clergy to Domestic Violence: Help or Hindrance?, 10 AGGRESSION
& VIOLENT BEHAV. 647, 649, 651 (2005); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of
Religious Deference, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2007).
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687, 712 (1994)
(pointing to this tendency).
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economic independence, and their higher expectations of sex equality,
gender equity, and intimacy within marriage.”161 Moreover, the fact that
most family law reformers have manifested little concern about gender
inequality in marriage, despite overwhelming evidence that it destabilizes
these unions,162 reinforces the conclusion that they “are seeking to strengthen
not just any marriage but a particular form of marriage, and one that women
will increasingly find unattractive.”163 Tellingly, some prominent advocates
of divorce restrictions explicitly reject equal responsibilities in marriage as
“nonsense”164 or “androgyny.”165
The Natural Family: A Manifesto, a 2005 statement issued by an affiliate of
the World Congress of Families, is an especially revealing example—
endorsed by “prominent national leaders of the traditional family values
movement”166—that overtly grounds opposition to marital freedom in a
vision of gender-differentiated family roles. The authors, Alan Carlson and
Paul Mero, stress their traditional view of marriage and family roles as the
basis for their resistance to liberal divorce, adultery, same-sex marriage, and
abortion.167 They celebrate the gender-differentiated family and view it as a
fact of nature,168 encourage state policies that regulate work and family
relations to reward parents who adhere to stereotypical gender roles in
161
162

163
164
165

166
167
168

MCCLAIN, supra note 156, at 119 (documenting and criticizing this tendency among marriage
promoters).
See, e.g., id. at 44 (“One form of inequality within marriage that may lead to instability, including
divorce, is women’s disproportionate performance of caregiving and household tasks.”); see also
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES
189 (2002) (characterizing the ideal of “gender equality” as “nonsense,” that it is “a fancy of the
upper middle class” and claiming that “ordinary men and women do not think that way”).
Bartlett, supra note 5, at 842–43.
WILSON, supra note 162, at 189.
MCCLAIN, supra note 156, at 147; see also David Popenoe, Modern Marriage: Revising the Cultural Script,
in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 247–61 (David
Popenoe et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the changes in marital roles and the subsequent confusion and
discord arising between spouses).
Siegel, supra note 105, at 1005.
Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, in THE FAMILY IN AMERICA
(2005).
See id. at 15 (“[T]he natural family is a fixed aspect of the created order, one ingrained in human
nature,” and “legitimate governments exist to shelter and encourage the natural family”); id. at 29
(“[W]e humans have been defined by the long-term bonding of a woman and a man, by their free
sharing of resources, by a complementary division of labor, and by a focus on the procreation,
protection, and rearing of children in stable homes.”); id. at 16 (“Culture, law, and policy should
take these [gender] differences into account. We affirm that the complementarity of the sexes is a
source of strength. Men and women exhibit profound biological and psychological differences.”).
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marriage, and deny women’s right to participate in education and
employment on equal terms with men.169 While explicitly acknowledging
their vulnerability to charges that they wish to subvert women’s rights and
reinforce patriarchal violence,170 they nevertheless advocate policies
designed to restore the gender-differentiated family of the 1950s.171
To achieve these goals, among the marriage movement’s leading
prescriptions is to “place the weight of the law on the side of spouses seeking
to defend their marriages [and] end state preferences for easy divorce by
repealing ‘no-fault’ statutes,”172 so as to “build a new culture of marriage,”173
and allow husbands and wives to “be nurtured toward and encouraged in
their proper roles.”174
Another notable example is a statement issued in 2011 by David R.
Usher, the president of the Center for Marriage Policy, and Michael J.
McManus, the president of Marriage Savers. Entitled “‘Ten Marriage
Economic Policies’ to Rebuild America,” this document identifies no-fault
divorce laws as “a mistake that encouraged marital irresponsibility.” The
statement’s first policy recommendation accordingly calls for a reform of
divorce law by only permitting a mutual-consent divorce and restoring the
fault-based regime. This new-old system would “permit divorce for defined
reasons, which must be proven” while rewarding the spouse who seeks to
preserve the marriage with three fourths of the marital assets. The
overarching goal of this policy, according to the statement, is to return
America to a marriage-based society which would “naturally resolve” the
169
170
171

172
173
174

See, e.g., id. at 25–26.
Id. at 24.
Id. (“It is true that we look with affection to earlier familial eras such as ‘1950’s America.’ We look
with delight on this record and aspire to recreate such results.”). Carlson and Mero admire the
American family model of the 1950s, attribute its fall in part to feminism and no-fault divorce, and
decry the following events as undermining the desirable social order. Coupling together a criticism
of liberal divorce policies and feminist challenges to traditional gender roles, they blame the “time
of moral shock and awe” that was the 1960s:
[N]ew legal challenges to successful family wage systems; conscious efforts to drive the
Creator out of civic life; the rapid spread of pornography; new demands for easy divorce;
attacks on the meaning of ‘wife’ and ‘husband’; a swelling rhetoric of ‘gender’ and ‘sexual’
rights; conscious state campaigns aimed at population control; steps toward easy abortion;
claims of sexual revolution; rejection of the concepts of duty and long-term commitment;
and startling advances in the manipulation of human life.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 28.
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“major problems of most unmarried mothers and their children” and ensure
“[a] woman’s right to be supported by, cared for, and helped by her
husband.”175 Marriage Savers also recommends the replacement of state
subsidies of cohabitation with marriage subsidies that would “[a]sk unwed
mothers at the birth of their baby if they are cohabiting; if so, do not give
state subsidies—unless they marry and take classes teaching conflict
resolution skills.”176
A bill along these lines has been proposed in at least two states. The bill
designates the person who seeks to preserve the marriage as the “responsible
spouse” who would get at least 70% of marital assets and half of child custody
time. However, “if there is actual evidence, with high evidentiary standards”
that the divorce-seeking spouse is the victim of physical abuse, adultery or
abandonment, “then s/he would be entitled to the benefits of a ‘responsible
spouse.’” The reform would also oblige the divorce court to divide both
assets and debts since “[c]urrently, they do not have to dispose of debts,
which the husband usually ends up with, an unfair pattern that often leaves
him broke.”177 As for child custody, the bill is predicated on the supposition
that “[y]oung children need the love of a mother most, and teenagers most
need the discipline a father can offer” and thus envisions a reversal of custody
arrangements from mother to father as children grow older, which “would
happen automatically, unless a spouse is found unfit or waives it.”178
The juxtaposition of gender prescriptions and divorce restrictions allows
us to infer that the “the real aim” of divorce reform proposals is to “enforce
a narrow and moralistic vision of marriage”179 in which women are
homemakers and men head the household.180 Feminists are therefore
175

176
177
178

179
180

David R. Usher & Michael J. McManus, “Ten Marriage Economic Policies” to Rebuild America, CTR.
FOR MARRIAGE POL’Y (Aug. 10, 2011), http://marriagepolicy.org/2011/08/10-marriage-valuespolicies/.
Mike McManus, Proposed Louisiana Divorce Reform and Cohabitation Reform, MARRIAGE SAVERS (Feb.
5, 2013), http://marriagesavers.org/sitems/News/News1030216Reform.htm.
Id. (detailing the bill introduced in Missouri and the bill expected in Louisiana).
Id. (“[C]ustody is divided 50-50, based on the number of years till the child is 18. If he is aged 4,
the mother would get custody for 7 years till age 11, then the father would have 7 years of custody
till age 18.”).
Katha Pollitt, Can This Marriage Be Saved?, NATION, Feb. 17, 1997, at 9.
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101 (1995) (describing some tactics used by proponents of
traditional marriage that include casting single mothers as “deviant”); Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral
Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997) (explaining a traditionalist view that
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rightfully concerned that reforms that inhibit marital freedom jeopardize
women’s equal status in both the family and society and lay the foundation
for gender-based stratification.181
When the advocacy of divorce-restrictive regulations is considered in
light of the gender bias that may animate it, it is clear that exit barriers being
sought today offend constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Such antidivorce laws would use the power of the state to upbear the patriarchal family
structure based on constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women
to the constraining sex-roles of the separate-spheres tradition. Yet, as the
Supreme Court elucidates, “[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped to a
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place
in society.”182 Limitations on divorce that restrict, degrade, and endanger
women violate not only the forms of dignity and decisional autonomy
constitutionally guaranteed to women by the Court’s “due process equality”
jurisprudence, but also by the Court’s very equal protection genderdiscrimination cases. Against this backdrop, legal challenges to strict divorce
laws should be properly seen as part of a larger challenge to a long legal
tradition of imposing gender roles on women that limited their public and
private identities to their prescribed roles as wives and mothers.
CONCLUSION
This diptych has conceptualized the right to marital freedom in a genderequality framework. It has argued that any constitutional concept of gender
equality, whether formal or substantive, must guarantee a right of exit from
an institution that has long been a locus of female subordination and still
leaves many women vulnerable to dependency, exploitation, and abuse. The
use of law to force a woman to remain subject to her husband is a
simultaneous affront to her liberty, dignity, and equality interests. It
entrenches archaic understandings of marital roles the Constitution now
repudiates and exposes women to systemic gender-based injuries both inside
and outside marriage. All substantive visions of equal protection thus

181

182

divorce is selfish, and arguing that children have a “morally based claim to require their parents to
stay together”).
Accordingly, all currents of feminism recognize resistance to the reintroduction of fault and the
enforcement of the traditional marital bargain as an obstacle to gender equality. See, e.g., Kay, supra
note 157, at 76–77; Carbone & Brinig, supra note 61, at 1010; see also Vansickle, supra note 7, at 156,
178; Scott, supra note 156, at 95–96.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
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envisage marital freedom as a remedy against state-facilitated gender
subordination and dignitary harm inflicted through marriage. As a result,
marital exit has naturally grown to become a sex-salient practice which
disrupts group inequality and helps ameliorate certain forms of gender
stratification. The law’s response to the divorce question thus bears heavily
on women’s equal citizenship in society, influencing what opportunities
women will have to participate fully in the nation’s social, political, and
economic life.
The antidiscrimination interpretation of equal protection, especially antistereotyping concerns, is also implicated in divorce laws. The historical
analysis proffered in this Article reveals the lineage and function of divorce
restrictions as gender-caste regulation. Oppressive marriage laws and limited
rights of exit have combined to promote traditional notions of masculine
domination and feminine submission and to cement the “natural” gender
order. Fault grounds in particular were informed by and in turn reproduced
and reinforced the separate-spheres ideology by policing the ways in which
men and women performed gender within marriage. By limiting exit and
simultaneously defining marital relations in ways that perpetuate status
inequalities between spouses, the state has shored up the patriarchal family
and denied women the equality and dignity that they are entitled to as
citizens. These legislative badges of state-imposed female disempowerment
must be eliminated as part of the constitutional movement towards a more
just and equal society.
Moreover, the contemporary calls to reinstate a facially neutral fault
scheme are also suspect according to a formal equality theory. This Article
has exposed such divorce-restrictive regulations as animated, at least in part,
by a constitutionally impermissible purpose. These antidivorce proposals
would not only impose gender-specific burdens on women, but also reflect
status-based judgments about women’s capacities, roles, and destinies from
which they have been emancipated by modern sex-discrimination
jurisprudence. Just as importantly, because divorce restrictions coerce
women to perform the work of wifehood without altering the conditions that
continue to make such work a principal cause of their subordination, they
are a form of status-reinforcing state action that offends constitutional
guarantees of equal protection.
A unilateral right to no-fault divorce, by contrast, accords women the
dignity of controlling their personal relationships and deciding for
themselves, as self-governing moral agents, for how long and on what terms
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to stay in marriage. A liberal dissolution right is a crucial form of self-defense
against the subjugating effects of private patriarchy which enables women to
disencumber themselves from stereotypes that would confine them to
constraining sex role prescriptions. Finally, the unimpeded availability of
marital freedom may promote gender equality as an organizing principle of
family life, by giving women leverage within marriage to resist unjust marital
arrangements and to establish more egalitarian unions after divorce.
All in all, a right to unilateral no-fault divorce is fundamental for women
attempting to navigate the world as equals and is imperative for a
constitutional democracy committed to disestablishing gender hierarchy and
second-class citizenship. Marital freedom is thus not simply a legal remedy
for broken hearts, but the linchpin of a social order committed to securing
genuine gender equality and human dignity for all women.

